The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: Unreasonably Dangerous to the Injured Consumer by DeSimone, Mark
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 18 Number 4 Article 6 
1980 
The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: Unreasonably 
Dangerous to the Injured Consumer 
Mark DeSimone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark DeSimone, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: Unreasonably Dangerous to the Injured 
Consumer, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 915 (1980). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol18/iss4/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The State of the Art Defense in Products
Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous"
to the Injured Consumer
I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary has been the predominant force in establishing the
legal duties of the manufacturer to the public in the products liability
arena. The threat of a lawsuit, with the attendant adverse publicity
and potential damages award, has continually prompted manufacturers
to improve the safety of their products.' Thus, lawsuits have not only
proven an effective deterrence to the manufacturing of unsafe prod-
ucts but have also provided adequate compensation for consumers and
employees. Moreover, products liability litigation has developed inde-
pendent legal duties which are frequently more stringent than those
imposed by either government regulation or the industry itself.2
Recently, manufacturers and insurers have charged that these court
decisions, which have imposed such stringent pro-consumer duties on
the manufacturer, have caused a products liability "crisis."3 The manu-
facturers additionally assert that as a result of the strict stance ad-
vanced by the judiciary, they must contend with increasing insurance
rates, higher product prices, and the real possibility of being forced
out of business. In response to these contentions, various governmen-
tal agencies and research institutions have investigated the allegations
of the manufacturers and insurers. Generally, these studies have con-
cluded that there is no products liability "crisis" and that high in-
1. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966); Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119-23 (1960).
2. See generally Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An In-
teraction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 462-63 (1974). There have been
numerous instances in which litigation has resulted in the manufacturer's adopting safer
and more stringent standards. For example, in McCormack v. HanksCraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967), the manufacturer of a steam vaporizer was held liable when
the vaporizer tipped over and spilled scalding water on the plaintiff. Subsequently, the
manufacturer redesigned the vaporizer with a screw-top cap and automatic shut-off.
In addition, label information and warnings have been required by the courts beyond
the requirements of governmental regulatory agencies. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v.
Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965).
3. See Swine Flu Immunization Program: Supplemental Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85 (1976) (statement of Leslie Cheek).
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surance rates are not attributable to the court-imposed duties on the
manufacturer.'
Despite the existence of overwhelming evidence establishing that a
"crisis" does not exist,5 the unified demand of the manufacturers and
insurers for products liability reform has not been ignored; many state
legislatures have tailored relief for the manufacturer in the form of
products liability statutes which dramatically limit the duties of the
manufacturer and restrict the recovery permitted an injured con-
sumer. The "state of the art defense" is an example of the legislative
response to the so-called products liability "crisis."
This comment will examine the significance of the state of the art'
in products liability cases. The distinction between the negligence and
strict liability standards is examined to determine the propriety of the
statutory state of the art defense and its ramifications to the injured
consumer. Finally, a recommendation will be presented as to the utility
of the state of the art in an evidentiary capacity and the manner in
which such evidence should be employed.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A major complaint of manufacturers has been that the courts, in
judging whether a product is defective, have viewed the products in
light of present technology, knowledge, or safety standards. In this
regard, manufacturers have traditionally argued that they should be
absolved from product liability upon proof of compliance with industry
custom or government standards. State legislation now provides a
state of the art defense, exonerating a manufacturer if his product con-
formed to either industry norms or government standards in existence
at the time the product was sold.7 Hence, under this legislation, lia-
4. See Product Liability Tort Reform: Crisis of Uncertainty (1979) (an unpublished
study by students and faculty of the Department of Engineering and Public Policy and the
Graduate School of Urban and Public Affairs of Carnegie Mellon University); Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, Draft Final Report 1-20 (1977) (an unpublished report
conducted under the direction of the United States Department of Commerce) [hereinafter
cited as Interagency Task Force]. The Interagency Task Force concluded that products
liability doctrines were not the cause of high insurance rates. Id. at 1-18, 19. The Task
Force observed that "a number of manufacturers . .. do not have planned product liabil-
ity loss prevention programs in the basic area of design research and quality control" and
that other manufacturers "do not provide adequate instruction about the dangers that
may spring from their products." Id. at 1-20, 21.
5. Interagency Task Force, supra note 4, at 1-20, 21.
6. For purposes of this comment, the state of the art is defined by industry custom
and government regulation, since the legislation in this area generally views the state of
the art from this perspective. The technological state of the art is not addressed by this
comment.
7. For a detailed discussion of the state of the art defense in products liability, see
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bility will not be imposed where the product conforms with similar
products of competing manufacturers or with prevailing government
standards.
There are two variations of this statutory defense. One creates a
rebuttable presumption that the product was not defective, while the
other provides the manufacturer with an absolute defense. A majority
of the state legislation has adopted the former view that compliance
with the state of the art creates a rebuttable presumption that the
product was not defective! Generally, the plaintiff has two methods
available to rebut the presumption: first, the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the risks permitted by a particular regulation are unreasonable to
the consumer; and second, the plaintiff can rebut the presumption by
showing that the processes by which the regulatory standards were
established, when compared with other government standards, were
inadequate to protect the interests of consumers.' The definition and
scope of this presumption varies among the jurisdictions. For example,
the rebuttable presumption created by the Utah Product Liability
Act'0 is limited to conformity with government safety standards exist-
ing at the time of manufacture.' In contrast, the Colorado statute, in
addition to providing a defense for products complying with govern-
Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Product Liability, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 101 (1977).
8. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3)
(1977). See also H.B. 188, N.J. Legis., 1980 Sess. § 7(2) (1980); H.B. 993, N.C. Legis., 1979
Sess. § 99B-7(d) (1979); H.B. 373, Tex. Legis., 1979 Sess. § 1 (1979).
9. See Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Pro-
posed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 626, 639-40 (1977). The author states:
[Pirocesses in which consumers have no substantial voice and which, either in terms
of their establishment or when viewed in historical perspective, clearly are in-
tended only to establish minimal safety standards, would be more likely to be
susceptible to arguments of inadequacy. On the other hand, a plaintiff would, and
should, have a more difficult time escaping the effects of a defendant-manufacturer's
compliance with a specific standard adopted after due consideration by an agency,
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which is recognized generally to
weigh and to promote the interests of consumers.
Id. at 639-40.
1t6. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-1 through -7 (1977).
11. Id. § 78-15-6(3). The Utah Product Liability Act provides in relevant part:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from defect or defec-
tive condition where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product
were in conformity with government standards established for that industry which
were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the product or the methods
and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted.
Id.
12. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-127.5, 13-21-401 through -405 (Supp. 1978).
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ment standards,"3 extends the defense to products conforming with the
state of the art.1'
The second approach, which has been enacted in Arizona 1 and Indi-
ana,"6 provides the manufacturer with an absolute state of the art
defense. In these jurisdictions, the manufacturer's compliance with in-
dustry custom or government standards automatically bars the plain-
tiffs case.1" Products which conform to the state of the art in existence
at the time of manufacture are considered nondefective. Under this ap-
proach, an examination of the nature and characteristics of the product
is never conducted.
The increasing amount of legislative activity in the strict products
liability area, along with the strong lobbying efforts of manufacturers
and insurers, has resulted in a recent legislative proposal in Penn-
sylvania- specifically, House Bill 1083.18 The proposed Pennsylvania
legislation creates an inference that a product is not defective if it con-
formed with recognized standards, designs, methods of testing or
manufacturing in existence at the time of the manufacture of the prod-
uct. 9 Although the Pennsylvania proposal establishes an inference and
not a rebuttable presumption, the practical effect is the same; namely,
the manufacturer is afforded a state of the art defense. 0 Accordingly,
the trial judge will instruct the jury that upon proof of compliance
with the state of the art, an inference is created that the product is
not defective and the manufacturer is not negligent. In order to over-
come such an inference in a design defect case, the plaintiff must show
that the state of the art of the entire industry was unreasonably
dangerous. Moreover, because this legislation would permit manufac-
13. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Supp. 1978).
14. The Colorado statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
In any product liability action, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the product
which caused the injury, death, or property damage was not defective and that the
manufacturer or seller thereof was not negligent if the product:
(a) Prior to sale by the manufacturer, conformed to the state of the art, as dis-
tinguished from industry standards, applicable to such product in existence at the
time of sale; or
(b) Complied with, at the time of sale by the manufacturer, any applicable
code, standard, or regulation adopted or promulgated by the United States or by
this state, or by any agency of the United States or of this state.
Id.
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-681 through -686 (Supp. 1979).
16. IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 4-20A-1 through -8 (Burns Supp. 1979).
17. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1979); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 4-20A-4(u)
(Burns Supp. 1979).
18. H.B. 1083, Pa. Legis., 1979 Sess. (1979).
19. Id. § 8359.
20. See note 47 infra.
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turers to dictate the proper safety measures to be incorporated into
products,2 the manufacturers' legal obligations to consumers would be
determined solely by manufacturers rather than by the judiciary. Con-
sequently, by allowing the manufacturer to show that due care was ex-
ercised in the manufacturing process, the proposed legislation is a
move away from the traditional strict liability concept,2 because appli-
cation of the proposed legislation would shift the focus of a products
liability suit from the nature of the product to the conduct of the
manufacturer.
The Pennsylvania proposal further evidences the recent trend of
legislative involvement in the strict products liability area, which indi-
cates that state legislative bodies are no longer content with the
general expansion of the manufacturers' liability by the courts. The
question that must be answered, however, is whether the state of the
art defense is the proper means of circumscribing the manufacturers'
liability without depriving the injured consumer of rightful recourse
against the negligent manufacturer.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSE
The determination of the state of the art necessarily involves an ex-
amination of the conduct of other manufacturers at the time the defen-
dant manufactured his product. 3 In a negligence case, this evidence is
particularly valuable since the negligence standard limits the liability
of the manufacturer to what was reasonably foreseeable." Specifically,
the conduct of the manufacturer is measured against what was reason-
ably foreseeable at the time of manufacture." In other words, the focus
in a negligence action is on the due care exercised by the manufac-
turer. Although the courts have admitted state of the art evidence in
negligence cases," it has not been recognized as affording an absolute
21. See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L.
REV. 677, 681 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson).
22. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
23. Karasik, "State of the Art or Science" Is It Defense to Products Liability?, 60
ILL. B.J. 348 (1972).
24. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977) (car-
buretor design dangerous for foreseeable use of normal driving).
25. Id. at 349.
26. See Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968) (evidence ad-
mitted of similar vent windows of different automobiles); Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972) (evidence admitted of unavailable safer snowmobile design
or guard); Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972) (evidence introduced of
customs of other service garages in storage of automobiles); Murphy v. Messerschmidt, 41
Ill. App. 3d 659, 355 N.E.2d 78 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 79, 368 N.E.2d 1299 (1977) (evidence
of present custom of contractors inadmissible).
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defense to the manufacturer. 7
The propriety of allowing the manufacturer a state of the art
defense in a strict products liability case is immediately questionable,
for in strict products liability, it must be remembered that it is the
product that is on trial and not the conduct of the manufacturer." Evi-
dence of due care on the part of the manufacturer is irrelevant.' This
principle is best illustrated by section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts, which holds the manufacturer liable even though he "has ex-
ercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.""0
By examining the conduct and custom of the industry, the defense per-
mits manufacturers to establish the standard by which their products
are judged, and this prompts an additional concern: namely, that the
conduct and customs of the entire industry may be negligent with
respect to a particular product." Certainly, the plaintiff will encounter
great difficulty overcoming the defense by arguing that the course of
conduct followed by an entire industry, which has never been judicially
or administratively condemned, should be declared an unreasonable
27. Bardorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 935, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305,
327 (1970); Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. D'Addaria Constr. Co., 33 Conn. Sup. Ct. 596,
363 A.2d 766 (1976); Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976). See also The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
662 (1932), where Justice Learned Hand stated that though customs may be evidence of
the reasonable standard of care, "[clourts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omis-
sion." Id. at 740.
28. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974); Mac-
Dougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969). In MacDougall, the
court distinguished negligence and strict liability by noting that:
The evidentiary requirements of negligence law demand proof that injury is
proximately caused by a specific defect in design or construction, because liability
hinges upon whether the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of
reasonable care. In contrast, the concern of both § 402A and warranty law is with
the fitness of the product, not the conduct of the producer as measured by due
care.
Id. at 391, 257 A.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
29. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (trial
court charges to jury regarding reasonableness of defendant's conduct held erroneous);
Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (1978) (evidence of feasibility of
mobile home design inadmissible); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d
226 (1979) (evidence of industry custom in installing safety devices inadmissible).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
31. See Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973). Indeed, it has
been suggested that the entire industry be held liable where a negligent manufacturer
adhered to an industry-wide custom in producing a product. See Comment, Industry-Wide
Joint Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 675 (1974). See also Hall v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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standard by which to judge the defendant's product.2 The statutory
defense could, therefore, perpetuate inadequate and antiquated in-
dustry standards since future manufacturers will readily adopt the
established industry standards, recognizing that the state of the art
defense offers them a shield from strict liability.
The defense also severely limits the role of one of the critical factors
currently viewed by the courts in determining liability in a design
defect case-the feasibility of alternative designs or manufacturing
processes.' Traditionally, strict liability is established upon the plain-
tiffs showing that feasible and safer alternatives existed at the time of
manufacture.' The statutory defense, however, diminishes the value of
this evidence in the products liability case. Because the plaintiff's case
is preliminarily decided upon the defendant's proof of compliance with
the state of the art in the states adopting an absolute state of the art
defense, the jury no longer has the opportunity to weigh the costs of
additional safeguards or alternate designs against the benefits they
provide. Correspondingly, in the states adopting the rebuttable pre-
sumption approach, the existence of feasible alternatives is no longer
conclusive proof of the defendant's liability but, instead, is mere evi-
dence balanced against the statutory presumption that the product is
32. For a discussion of the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs in proving the inade-
quacy of industry custom, see Johnson, supra note 21, at 683.
33. See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant's
meat grinder attained most feasible safety level available); Horn v. General Motors Corp.,
17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976). In Horn, plaintiff was injured when
the impact of an auto collision drove her into sharp prongs designed to hold the horn cap
on her car's steering wheel. The manufacturer was held liable, despite compliance with in-
dustry custom, since an inexpensive and safer alternative design was available. Id at 362,
551 P.2d at 401, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
It is important to note that if legislation provided a technological state of the art
defense, this argument would be inapposite. The technological state of the art is defined
by what could have scientifically been done at the time of manufacture as opposed to the
statutory definition of state of the art, which views what was in fact being done at the
time of manufacture. Accordingly, the technological state of the art is determined by
measuring the feasibility of alternatives, and evidence of possible alternate designs or
manufacturing processes is admissible. See 43 J. Am L. & COM. 587, 592 (1977).
34. See Balido v. Improved Mach. Corp., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1972), heamng denied (1973) (defendant's press defective since feasible safety gates and
hand controls available); Muncy v. General Motors Corp., 357 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962) (defendant's ignition switch not defective since warning light or buzzer not feasible
alternative). An excellent example of the significance of the concept of feasible alterna-
tives to the plaintiff's case is Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1970), where an arm of the plaintiff was mangled when he reached into an open washing
machine and it began to spin. The court observed that the manufacturer could have in-
stalled microswitches to shut off the machine when the door was open for the minimum
cost of two dollars. Id at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
1980
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not defective. These results are particularly objectionable considering
that many products liability cases have been decided in favor of in-
jured consumers based on the existence of feasible alternatives. 5 For
example, in LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,3" a child was seriously injured
when his jacket exploded into flames. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania stated that the injury could
have been prevented if the manufacturer had applied to the jacket a
flame-retardant chemical, which was available for "only a few cents."37
In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,"8 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit observed that the manufacturer has a duty to adopt
an alternative design if it involves "no substantial increase in price";
however, the court noted that a safety feature which "would appre-
ciably add to cost, add little to safety, and take a product out of the
price range of the market" would not serve as the basis for imposing
liability. 9 Hence, it is readily discernible that the feasibility of alterna-
tive designs is critical to decisions involving product defect. Under the
statutory defense, the manufacturer may be excused from liability
despite the existence of alternate low cost safety designs or features
which were available at the time of manufacturing.
Furthermore, the statutory defense permitted for compliance with
government regulations is equally objectionable. Traditionally, compli-
ance with government regulations has been but one of several factors
viewed by the courts in determining liability."0 At best, government
regulations operate as a "floor" below which consumer products must
not fall." If consumers are injured by products which meet these mini-
mum governmental standards, they nevertheless are entitled to demon-
strate the product's defectiveness by proving the existence of feasible
alternatives.'2 The state of the art defense, however, has the effect of
35. See notes 33-34 supra.
36. 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
37. Id. at 379.
38. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 1073. See also Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1187 (5th Cir. 1974)
(safety devices on defendant's grinder most feasible alternative available).
40. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); LaGorga v. Kroger
Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Nevis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 626, 275
P.2d 761 (1954); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 281 A.2d 797 (1971); Kemp
v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1970).
. 41. See 122 Cong. Rec. 16,346 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Taft). See also U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, 5 FINAL REPORT OF THE
LEGAL STUDY 1 113 (1971).
42. Brodsky & Cohen, "Uncle Sam," the Product Safety Man: Consumer Product
Safety Standards in the Marketplace and in the Courts, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 619, 648-49
(1974). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
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precluding this evidence once product conformity is proven by the
manufacturer.
Application of this defense would also adversely affect the safety of
products. Governmental regulations are not reliable standards in that
they are not predicated solely upon considerations of safety; rather,
political considerations and the lobbying efforts of manufacturers are
often reflected in the regulations.'3 Moreover, safety regulations cannot
anticipate every instance in which a product may be dangerous in nor-
mal use. And government regulations which may have been adequate
when originally enacted are often obsolete and fall well below the level
of safety needed for products manufactured at a later date. By pre-
venting the courts from determining the standards by which a product
is judged, the defense frustrates product improvement since the manu-
facturer is satisfied merely to comply with the minimum government
regulations. Therefore, the manufacturers' compliance with the state of
the art, whether reflected in industry custom or government regula-
tions, may not be the appropriate gauge for determining liability in the
context of a strict liability case."
When viewing the policy considerations underlying strict products
liability and the case law that has developed in the area, the incon-
sistency of the state of the art defense becomes even more apparent.
For instance, factors such as risk allocation and safety incentives de-
mand that the manufacturer be precluded from asserting a state of the
art defense. The courts have historically viewed the imposition of
strict liability as a vehicle for economic risk distribution by recogniz-
ing that the manufacturer is in a superior position to purchase insur-
ance and spread the cost."5 Accordingly, strict liability requires that
the responsibility for injuries fall upon the party that placed a danger-
ous product in the stream of commerce and not on the innocent con-
sumer.'" But with the availability of the state of the art defense, the
43. See Interagency Task Force, supra note 4, at VII-30. For example, the Consumer
Product Safety Act provides that safety standards are to be developed by outside parties. 15
U.S.C. § 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). Generally, manufacturers' organizations are the
only outside parties interested in undertaking the expense involved with establishing the
standards. The lack of objectivity in the development of these standards is clear.
44. Scarzafava, An Analysis of Products Liability Defenses in the Aftermath of
Hopkins, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 261, 270-71 (1977). Contra, Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in
Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIo N.L. REv. 249 (1977).
45. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
46. In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), for example, the
manufacturer was held liable when a defectively designed carburetor locked and caused
the driver to lose control of his truck. The court stated that "liability is not rested upon
what he knew or should have known when he manufactured or sold the product; it rests
on his placing into the stream of commerce a product which is demonstrated at trial to
1980
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manufacturer's liability is not defined by his placing a product on the
market; instead, his liability is contingent upon compliance with in-
dustry custom and government regulations.
Regarding the objective of enhanced safety, the defense is counter-
productive and encourages stagnation in product safety and develop-
ment.47 By allowing manufacturers to establish the standards by which
their products are judged, the state of the art defense effectively
limits the extent. of industrial research, testing and advancement.
Desiring to avoid the cost of further safety research and development,
the manufacturer will be content to maintain the status quo of the
state of the art.4" Thus, profit maximization and not product safety is
advanced by the defense.49 Conversely, the potential threat of liability
caused by the elimination of the defense would promote product re-
search and development while insuring the consumer a safer product.
Finally, the statutory defense is entirely inconsistent with the case
law that has developed in this area, since courts have not only repeat-
edly rejected the state of the art as a defense in strict liability actions,
but have also totally denied the introduction of any evidence of the
state of the art in such actions.' For instance, in Bailey v. Boatland of
Houston, Inc.," the plaintiff was thrown from a boat and subsequently
hit by the propeller. The lower court permitted the defendant to intro-
duce evidence of the unavailability of safety devices, which would have
automatically stopped the motor, as a defense to the suit.2 On appeal,
have been dangerous." Id. at 351. Accord, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169
(Fla. 1963).
47. See Product Liability Bilk Hearings on H.B. 1083 Before the House Insurance
Comm., Pa. Legis., 1979 Sess. (testimony of William C. Archibald, Jr.); Product Liability
Legislation" Hearings on H.B. 1083 Before the House Insurance Comm., Pa. Legis., 1979
Sess. (statement of Harry Boyer).
48. See 41 TENN. L. REV. 357, 363 (1974).
49. See generally Nadar & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 645 (1967).
50. Holloway v. J. B. Systems, Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979); Walker v. Trico
Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Jeng v. Witters,
452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Al. 1979); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253,
589 P.2d 896 (1978); Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr.
122 (1979); Foglio v. Western Auto Supply, 56 Cal. App. 3d 470, 128 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1976);
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Anderson v. Hyster Co.,
74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (1979); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635,
340 N.E.2d 276 (1975); Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110
(1973); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Olson v. A. W.
Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977); Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa.
176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968); Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d 226 (1979).
51. 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
52. Id at 807.
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the Texas Court of Appeals found that evidence of the state of the art
is relevant only to examine the issue of care exercised by the manufac-
turer" and concluded that evidence of the defendant's compliance with
the state of the art is not admissible in any respect in a strict liability
action.' Most recently, in Holloway v. J. B. Stevens, Ltd. ,5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania
law, found that state of the art evidence is not relevant to a strict
liability action"6 since "negligence concepts such as 'trade custom' or
'reasonable care' have no place in suits brought under section 402A. ' 57
These decisions evidence a general reluctance to inject any negli-
gence elements into the strict liability theory. To avoid any potential
confusion on the part of the jury as to whether a section 402A plaintiff
must also prove the absence of due care as part of his prima facie case,
these courts totally precluded the jury from considering evidence of
the state of the art in determining the manufacturers' liability. More-
over, because state of the art evidence is not conclusive in negligence
cases5 where the conduct and due care of the manufacturer is at issue,
such evidence possesses even less probative value in strict products
liability and certainly does not merit legislative recognition as a
defense."
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE STATE OF THE
ART IN STRICT LIABILITY
Although the societal interest in protecting the consumer indicates
that the manufacturer's compliance with industry custom and govern-
ment regulations should not operate as a defense, the manufacturer's
interest in not becoming an insurer of his product must also be pro-
tected. State of the art evidence could conceivably aid in the jury
determination of the defendant's liability. Thus, the fact that the state
of the art should not be a defense does not necessarily prohibit the use
of such evidence in other aspects of the products liability case. Indeed,
it has been argued that such evidence is relevant to prove that a prod-
53. Id. at 809.
54. I& at 811.
55. 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979).
56. Id at 1073.
57. Id.
58. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
59. Courts often reject the state of the art defense and then proceed to hold the
defendant liable on the basis of noncompliance with the state of the art. See Anderson v.
Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (Ill. 1979); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571
S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
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uct is unavoidably unsafe within the comment k' exception to strict
liability, and to establish that a product is not defective.
A. Evidence That the Product Is "Unavoidably
Unsafe" Under Comment k
Courts have incorporated state of the art evidence into a strict lia-
bility case where the action is premised upon comment k to section
402A of the Restatement. Comment k provides in pertinent part that:
There are some products which in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use.... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous.... The seller of such products ... is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences . . . merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, atten-
dant with a known but apparently reasonable risk."1
The purpose of comment k is to provide an exception from strict lia-
bility for "unavoidably unsafe" products. Introduction of state of the
art evidence is essential to show that the product is "unavoidably un-
safe" within the comment k exception. 2 First, the manufacturer must
be allowed to introduce evidence demonstrating the absence of safer
manufacturing processes in the industry; in this respect, state of the
art evidence is often the best evidence available. Second, state of the
art evidence is relevant proof of the utility of the product since it
proves the unavailability of substitutes. This exception has primarily
operated to exempt the drug industry from strict liability.63 In Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc.," the plaintiff had undergone extended treatment
with drugs for a skin disease. The plaintiff eventually went blind, and
expert testimony identified the condition as a reaction to the drugs.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that comment k was
applicable and exempted the defendant from strict liability. 5
Although the courts recognize that drugs involve a high degree of
risk, strict liability has been deemed inappropriate in most cases in-
volving drugs because of the important benefits enjoyed by the public
in the effective treatment of disease and pain. Moreover, without some
protective assurances, the manufacturers of these essential, but in-
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
61. Id.
62. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text infra.
63. Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L.
REV. 649, 655-59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The State of the Art Defense].
64. 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
65. Id. at 419.
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herently risky products, would hesitate to market them. This drug ex-
ception has been extended to other facets of the medical industry. For
example, in Hines v. St. Joseph Hospital,8 the plaintiff received a
transfusion from blood supplied by the defendant. The plaintiff subse-
quently contracted hepatitus, which is a medically recognized risk
associated with blood transfusions. 7 After examining state of the art
evidence, establishing that no test or other process was available to
detect and prevent hepatitus, the New Mexico Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the defendant could not be found strictly liable. According
to the court, the risk associated with blood transfusions is outweighed
by the great public benefit derived from the product. 9
Although primarily utilized in cases involving products relating to
the medical industry, one court has suggested that the comment k ex-
ception can be extended to other products. Under this approach, once a
product is recognized as "unavoidably unsafe" the exemption from
strict liability would operate, regardless of the type of product. In
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,"' the plaintiff developed
asbestosis as a result of being exposed to asbestos insulation manufac-
tured by the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that since the evidence showed that the product was "unavoidably
unsafe," strict liability would not be appropriate, provided that the
warning requirements of comment k had been met."
In sum, the public benefit derived from the manufacture of these
"unavoidably unsafe" products has been consistently emphasized by
the courts as the justification for permitting them into the market-
place. Likewise, this argument permits the manufacturer to introduce
state of the art evidence in a comment k case, for absent an indulgent
evidentiary rule, production of the questionable items would probably
cease.
B. Evidence That the Product Is Not "Defective"
Because an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case in strict prod-
ucts liability is proof of product defect," proponents favoring the ad-
missibility of state of the art evidence argue that the evidence is rele-
66. 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974).
67. Id. at 765, 527 P.2d at 1076.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
71. Id. at 1088, 1099.




vant to prove that the product is not defective.73 The court's definition
of the term "defective" is, therefore, critical to this proposition.
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts provides that in order to
find a product defective, "[tlhe article must be dangerous beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common in the community as to its
characteristics."7 To establish liability under section 402A, the plaintiff
must show that the product was dangerous beyond the expectations of
the ordinary consumer."5 Proponents of the admissibility of state of the
art evidence assert that since the question of product defect depends
upon whether or not the danger involved in its use would be apparent
to a reasonable consumer, state of the art evidence can be used to
show that the product is similar to other products of that type, and
therefore, "an ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to its characteristics""6 would have realized
the potential danger.7 7
This approach is illustrated in Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,"8
where the plaintiff asserted that the seats and seat fastenings in the
defendant's aircraft were not designed to withstand a crash.79 The
plaintiff relied on evidence proving the availability of safer aircraft
seats eighteen years after the manufacture of the aircraft as establish-
ing defect."s The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
state of the art evidence was admissible to determine the expectations
of the ordinary consumer." In this context, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs could not prove that "the ordinary consumer would ex-
pect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in
1970.""s2 Similarly, in Jeng v. Witters,3 the plaintiff claimed that his in-
jury resulted from a defectively designed door latch on the defendant's
car. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania admitted state of the art evidence showing the door latch was
73. See The State of the Art Defense, supra note 63, at 653-55. See also 43 J. AIR L.
& COM. 587 (1977).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352-53 (1965).
75. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969);
Jackson v. City of Biloxi, 272 So.2d 654 (Miss. 1973); Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 1129, 359 A.2d 822 (1976).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
77. See The State of the Art Defense, supra note 63, at 654.
78. 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 445-46.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 447.
82. Id.
83. 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
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in conformity with industry practice." The court concluded that since
the door latch resembled similar products on the market, it was not
defective because it did not present a danger which was unexpected or
which would not have been anticipated by the ordinary consumer.85
By defining "defective" in terms of the expectations of the ordinary
consumer and admitting state of the art evidence as proof, this ap-
proach incorrectly concludes that the expectation of an ordinary con-
sumer concerning the safety of a product can be established according
to trade custom and practices within the industry." The purpose of
strict tort liability is not satisfied by defining the expectations of con-
sumers according to the actions of manufacturers whose products may
be defective,87 for it is the manufacturer, not the consumer, who has ac-
cess to and understanding of the relevant research and technical data
relating to the product. The approach thus presumes that the ordinary
consumer possesses the same technical expertise as the manufacturer.
Although the manufacturer is held to the knowledge of an expert and
is required to be aware of the state of the art,8 it cannot be persua-
sively argued that the consumer should also be held to the knowledge
of an expert. The expectations of the ordinary consumer should instead
be based upon consumer experience with the product itself and not
upon the expert technological knowledge of the manufacturers within
the industry.
Several commentators have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
section 402A definition of the term "defective."8 Dean Wade has pro-
posed an alternative definition of the term, comprised of seven factors
which are balanced under a risk-benefit analysis to determine the
liability of the manufacturer." These factors are: (1) the usefulness and
84. Id. at 1362.
85. Id at 1362, 1363. See also Jackson v. City of Biloxi, 272 So.2d 654 (Miss. 1973),
where a plaintiff was injured when kerosene from a lamp manufactured by the defendant
splashed on his legs. In rejecting plaintiff's claim of strict liability, the court relied on
evidence that the design was old and accepted, and stated that "'defective condition'
means that the article has something wrong with it, that it did not function as expected."
Id. at 656 (quoting State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966)).
86. Commentators have increasingly criticized the definition of defective in terms of
the expectations of consumers. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect,
39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 349 (1974); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 572 (1969).
87. Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d at 808.
88. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968)
(defendant held to knowledge of expert concerning availability of safety devices).
89. See note 88 supra.
90. Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973). The author notes that the seven factors assist in determining "whether the magni-
tude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the
social utility attained by putting it out in this fashion." Id. at 835.
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desirability of the product;9 ' (2) the availability of other and safer prod-
ucts to meet the same need;92 (3) the likelihood of injury and its prob-
able seriousness;93 (4) the obviousness of the danger;9 4 (5) common
knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger;95 (6) the avoid-
ability of injury by care in use of the product;" and (7) the ability to
eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the
product or making it unduly expensive. 7 The courts have increasingly
recognized and applied the Wade definition for the term "defective."9
In Dorsey v. Yoder,9 for example, the court analyzed the section 402A
definition along with the Wade definition and concluded that the Wade
approach offered a more precise definition for the term "defective."100
Under the Wade approach, state of art evidence is considered. Since
the "availability of other and safer products" is examined, 1 evidence
concerning the products of other manufacturers is admissible in this
respect. In addition, it would seem that the manufacturer can intro-
duce evidence of the technological state of the art to establish that he
did not possess the "ability to eliminate the danger" presented by the
product.0 2
In any event, whether "defective" is defined in terms of the expecta-
tions of consumers"' or according to the Wade factors,"' state of the
91. See Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973) (frequency of
use of product admissible).
92. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 51 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972)
(availability of alternate safety features admissible).
93. See Robbins v. Alberto-Culver Co., 210 Kan. 147, 499 P.2d 1080 (1972) (evidence of
reasonable foreseeability of harm for jury).
94. See Zambrana v. Standard Oil Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 209, 102 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1972)
(obviousness of danger precluded plaintiff's recovery).
95. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 945 (1968) (warning must be supplied to public for inherently dangerous product).
96. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967) (misuse of product
by plaintiff barred recovery).
97. Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) (recovery where
alternate safety device was practical and would not impair the product).
98. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968);
Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach.
Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974);
Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
99. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 760. See also Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
101. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 77-88 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 90-102 and accompanying text supra.
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art evidence may be admissible for purposes of judging product
defect."5 However, that the admission of such evidence of due care in a
strict products liability case could cause confusion to the jury cannot
be ignored. ' Perhaps this concern can be resolved by introducing the
evidence under the multiple admissibility doctrine, ' ' with the atten-
dant cautionary jury instruction. In Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing
Co.,"0 8 for example, the jury was instructed that the state of the art
evidence was relevant for the limited purpose of determining defect.
Further, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff did not have to
prove the absence of due care or negligence by the manufacturer in a
strict liability case."° The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
instruction was sufficient to eliminate any potential jury confusion and
justified the admission of the evidence. " ' This is an acceptable ap-
proach for the admission of state of the art evidence, because it mini-
mizes the impact that evidence of due care has in a strict liability case
and yet assists the jury in resolving the difficult question of defective-
ness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of strict products liability is to afford consumers a less
burdensome alternative to a negligence theory of recovery. Eliminat-
ing the fault concepts of negligence and minimizing the relevance of in-
dustry custom and government standards are the means to attain this
end. For this reason, the focus of a strict liability action is placed upon
an examination of the product, and not the conduct of the manufac-
turer. The liability of the manufacturer is not, and should not be, con-
clusively decided on the basis of his compliance with the conduct of
other manufacturers; instead, it is his marketing of a dangerous prod-
uct into the stream of commerce that subjects the manufacturer to
strict liability.'
105. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (knowledge
of defendant at time of manufacture determines defectiveness). See also Baker v. Chrysler
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099
(Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
106. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
107. Under the multiple admissibility doctrine, evidence that is admissible for one pur-
pose is not rendered inadmissible because it is inadmissible for another purpose. I J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1940); FED. R. EvID. 105.
108. 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968).
109. 1& at 185, 242 A.2d at 234.
110. Id. See also Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1363 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem.,
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
111. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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The statutory state of the art defense, however, signals a return to
a negligence standard by focusing on the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct, as defined by his compliance with industry custom
or government standards. This defense subrogates the liability without
fault and the allocation of risk theories of strict liability to negligence
theories which are detrimental to the injured consumer. Although it is
.a recognized fact that one price of doing business is assuring the pro-
tection of the public from the dangers of the product, regardless of the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct,112 the statutory defense
affords the manfuacturer who complies with the statutory state of the
art a discount to this business cost. Deciding that state of the art is in-
appropriate as a defense in strict products liability, does not, however,
prohibit the utility of such evidence for other purposes in products
liability litigation. Indeed, since a majority of products liability cases
are commenced under both negligence and strict liability theories of
recovery, it would be impossible to argue that state of the art evidence
should be entirely excluded from such cases."1 As noted earlier, the
manufacturer should be permitted to prove the state of the art as evi-
dence of the "unavoidably unsafe" nature of a comment k product or
the defectiveness of a particular product. A jury instruction pointing
out the limited purpose of the evidence prevents any confusion sur-
rounding the elements of proof necessary for a finding of strict liability.
Under this approach, the spirit of strict liability would be maintained
since the injured consumer's right to recover is not conclusively
precluded by the manufacturer's proof of compliance with the state of
the art. At the same time, the manufacturer is not rendered an insurer
of his product since liability is reasonably circumscribed by allowing
the jury to consider compliance with government regulations and in-
dustry customs as evidence in favor of the defendant. In contrast,
where state of the art is presented as a statutory defense the balance
is upset, for an unwarranted barrier to recovery is imposed upon the
injured consumer while the manufacturer of a dangerous product is af-
forded a shield from liability.
Mark DeSimone
112. Id.
113. By bringing suit under both theories, the plaintiff opens the door for the intro-
duction of evidence relating to negligence concepts, including the manufacturer's com-
pliance with the state of the art. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Ford Motor Co., 269 Or. 399, 525
P.2d 130 (1974).
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